Publications of Drew Fudenberg, May 2008

Published Papers

  1. "Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races," (with R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz and J. Tirole), European Economic Review, 22 (1983), 3-31.

  2. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games" (with D. K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (1983), 251-268.

  3. "Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility" (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 31, (1983), 227-250.

  4. "Learning by Doing and Market Performance" (with J. Tirole), Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1983), 522-530.

  5. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information" (with J. Tirole), Review of Economics Studies, 50 (1983), 221-247.

  6. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look" (with J. Tirole), American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 361-366. Reprinted in O. Williamson ed. Industrial Economics, Edward Elgar, 1990; in Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives, J. Gabszewicz and J. Thisse, eds., Edward  Elgar, 1999, in Readings in Games and Information, E. Rasmussen, ed., Basil Blackwell (2001), in Readings in Industrial Economics, L. Cabral ed., Basil Blackwell (2000), and in The Economics of Business Strategy, J. Kay ed., Edward Elgar, 2003.

  7. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," (with J. Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), 383-402; reprinted in Game Choices, Geven Grenadier, Editor, Risk Books, 2000., and Readings in Industrial Economics,  L. Cabral, ed., Blackwell Publishers, 2000.  

  8. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information" (with D. K. Levine and J. Tirole), pp. 73-98 in A. Roth, ed., Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

  9. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria" (with D. K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1986), 261-279.

  10. "Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information" (with E. Maskin), Econometrica, 54 (1986), 533-554.

  11. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly" (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 54 (2986), 943-960.

  12. "A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation" (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (1986), 366-376.

  13. "Incomplete-Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities" (with D. K. Levine and J. Tirole), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (1987), 37-50.

  14. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Uses of Game Theory in Industrial Organization" (with J. Tirole), American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 77 (1987), 176-183.

  15. "Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents" (with D. Kreps), Review of Economic Studies, 54 (1987), 541-568.

  16. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements" (with D. Kreps and D. K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 354-380.

  17. "Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players" (with D. K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 1-18.

  18. "An Example of Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium" (with P. Diamond), Journal of Political Economy, 97 (1989), 606-619.

  19. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player" (with D. K. Levine), Econometrica, 57 (1989), 759-778.

  20. "Game Theory for Industrial Organization: Introduction and Overview" (with J. Tirole), Ch. 5 in D. Schmalansee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York, 1989.

  21. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games" (with E. Maskin) American Economic Review, 80 (1990), 274-279.

  22. "Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships" (with B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), 1-32.

  23. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games" (with E. Maskin), Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), 194-206.

  24. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players" (with D. Kreps and E. Maskin), Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), 555-573.

  25. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts" (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 58 (1990), 1279-1320.

  26. "Rational Play with Payoff Uncertainty" (with E. Dekel), Journal of Economic Theory, 52 (1990), 243-267.

  27. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games" (with E. Maskin), Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 428-438.

  28. "Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium" (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 236-260.

  29. "An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information" (with D. K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 54 (1991), 26-47.

  30. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed" (with D. K. Levine), Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992), 561-581.

  31. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks" (with C. Harris), Journal of Economic Theory, 57 (1992), 420-441.

  32. "Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships," in J. J. Laffont, ed., Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

  33. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium" (with D. K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 523- 546.

  34. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium" (with D. K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 547-574.

  35. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning" (with G. Ellison), Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 612-643.

  36. "Learning Mixed Equilibria" (with D. Kreps), Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (1993) 320-367.

  37. "Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players" (with D. K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 62 (1994), 103-135.

  38. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information" (with D. K. Levine and E. Maskin), Econometrica, 62 (1994), 997-1039; reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory,  E. Maskin, ed., Edward Elgar, 1994, and in Cartels,  S. Salant and M. Levenstein, ed., Edward Elgar, 2004.

  39. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria," (with D. Kreps), Games and Economic Behavior, 8 (1995), 20-55.

  40. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents" (with J. Tirole), Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995), 75-93.

  41. "Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learning" (with G. Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 93-126.

  42. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," (with D. K. Levine), The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19 (1995), 1065-1089.

  43. "Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent," (with M. Celentani, D. K. Levine , and W. Pessendorfer), Econometrica, 64 (1996) 691-704

  44. "Measuring Player's Losses in Experimental Games," (with D. K. Levine) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 479-506.

  45. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," (with D. K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer), Journal of Economic Theory 79 (1998) 46-71.

  46. "Trade-Ins, Upgrades, and Buy-Backs" (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics 29(1998), 235-258.

  47. "Learning in Games: Where Do We Stand?" (with D. K. Levine), European Economic Review 42(1998), 631-639.

  48. "Conditional Universal Consistency," (with D. K. Levine) Games and Economic Behavior 29(1999) 104-130.

  49. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," (with D. K. Levine) Games and Economic Behavior 29(1999) 131-137.

  50. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium"( with E. Dekel and D. K. Levine) Journal of Economic Theory 89(1999), 165-185

  51. "Learning Purified Equilibria," (with G. Ellison) Journal of Economic Theory 90(2000) 84-115.

  52. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades of Computer Software" (with G. Ellison) Rand Journal of Economics 31(2000),253-272.

  53. "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching" (with J. Tirole) Rand Journal of Economics 31(2000),634-657.

  54. "Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good" (with J. Tirole) Journal of Industrial Economics 48(2000) 373-390.

  55. "Subjective Uncertainty about Behavior Strategies: A Correction (with E. Dekel and D. K. Levine) Journal of Economic Theory 104 (2002), 473-478.

  56. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?" (with G. Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2003), 1249-1278.

  57. "Word-of-Mouth Learning” (with A. Banerjee), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 1-22.

  58. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," (with E. Dekel and D. K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 282-303.

  59. "Competing Auctions,” (with G. Ellison and M. Mobius), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2004), 30-66.
  60. "Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations,”( with M. Nowak, A. Sasaki, and C. Taylor ) Nature, 428(2004), 646-650.

  61. "Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," (with M. Nowak and C. Taylor) Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 66(2005),1621-1644.

  62. Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection,"  (with  L.  Imhof and M.  Nowak) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102(2005): 10797-10800.

  63.  "Learning and Belief Based Trade", (with D. K. Levine) The Latin American Journal of Economics, 42 (2005): 199-207.

  64. “Superstition and Rational Learning,” (with D. K. Levine) American Economic Review 96 (2006):630-651.

  65. “Topologies on Types” (with E. Dekel and S. Morris), Theoretical Economics  1(2006):  275-309.
  66. “Advancing Beyond  Advances in Behavioral Economics,Journal of Economic Literature  44(2006): 694-711.

  67. “Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutations,” (with L. Imhof, M. Nowak and C. Taylor) Theoretical Population Biology 70(2006):  352-363.

  68. “Imitation Processes with Small Mutations,” (with L. Imhof),  Journal of Economic Theory,

  69. 131 (2006):  251–262

  70. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control" (with D. Levine), American Economic Review 96(2006):1449-1476.

  71. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games," (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory 132(2007):461-473.

  72. "Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition" (with M. Villas-Boas) in Economics and Information Systems ed. T. Hendershott, Elsevier, Oxford, 2007.

  73. Interim Rationalizability," (with E. Dekel and S. Morris), Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 15-40.

  74. "Existence of Equilibrium in Double Auctions," (with M. Mobius and A. Szeidl), Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007), 550-567.

  75. "An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," (with D.K. Levine), Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007), 378-381.

  76. "Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?" (with L.A. Imhof and M.A. Nowak), Journal of Theoretical Biology 247 (2007), 574-580.

  77. "Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient" (with D.K. Levine and S. Talahashi) Games and Economic Behavior 61(2007), 27-49.

  78. "Continuous-Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring" (with D.K. Levine) Review of Economic Dynamics 10(2007), 173-192

  79. "Winners Don't Punish," (with A. Dreber, D. Rand and M. Nowak), Nature 452 (2008), 348-351.

  80. "Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations" (with L. Imhof) Journal of Economic Theory140 (2008), 229-245.

  81. "When is reputation bad?" (with J. Ely and D.K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008), 498-526.

Books and Monograph

  • Dynamic Models of Oligopoly (with J. Tirole), Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986, 83 pp. Translated into Italian as Modelli Dinamici di  Oligopolio (translated by Gianmaria Martini, edited by A. Giuffre, Testi Scelti di Economia, 1994, Milano: Italy.

  • Game Theory (with J. Tirole), MIT Press, 1991, 579 pp., translated into Chinese by Renin University Press, Beijing.

  • The Theory of Learning in Games (with D. K. Levine), MIT Press, 1998, 276 pp., translated into Chinese by Renin University Press, Beijing.

  • Working Papers

  • "Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play" (with S. Takahashi)
  • "Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets" (with D. K. Levine).
  • "Negotiations, Strikes, and Wage Settlements" (with D. K. Levine and P. Ruud), paper presented at NBER Conference on Trade Unions, May 1983.
  • "Learning in Extensive-Form Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium", (with D. Kreps) HIER Working Paper, 1994.
  • "Evolution and Noisy Repeated Games," (with E. Maskin).
  • "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms for Adverse Selection Problems" (with D. K. Levine and E. Maskin).
  • "When is Reputation Bad?" (With J. Ely and D. K. Levine) 2004, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
  • "Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents" (with R. Anderson and G. Ellison) 2004
  • "Multi-Dimensional Muddling" (with L. Imhof) 2006 , forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory
  • "Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics" (with G. Ellison and L. Imhof) 2006.
  • "Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring and Short Time Periods" (with D .K. Levine) 2006