Articles by Topic

(topics organized by date of earliest paper; some papers are listed more than once)

 

Theoretical Industrial Organization    

Patent races, strategic investment (and “state-space” later named Markov, equilibrium), learning-by-doing, technology adoption, predatory pricing, price discrimination, network goods, upgrades, customer poaching.

 

Foundations and Mathematics of Game Theory    

Definitions and properties of solution concepts, approximating one game with another, robustness of solutions to payoff uncertainty, topologies on games and on beliefs, large-population limits.

 

Bargaining. Contracting, Renegotiation, and  Mechanism Design  

Inefficient delay in bargaining, the Coase conjecture, signalling through offers, choice of bargaining partner, decentralizing long-term contracts. Also signal-jamming, renegotiation of incentive contacts, income smoothing, competing firms offering long-term contracts.

 

Repeated Games   

Observed and imperfectly observed actions, long-run and short-run players, Nash vs. perfect equilibria, the role of publicly observed mixed strategies and the full-dimensionality assumption, evolutionary arguments, continuous-time limits.  

 

Reputation Effects  

Reputation-building against various classes of opponents (simultaneous, short-run, “medium-run”); with observed or imperfectly observed actions, and in simultaneous-move or extensive-form stage games.

 

Macroeconomics  (?)

 

Evolution, Learning, and other Non-Equilibrium Adjustment Processes

What sorts of adjustment processes govern non equilibrium play, when do they converge, and what can they converge to?

 

Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and Game Theory Experiments

 

Theoretical Industrial Organization    

 

“Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races,” (with R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz and J. Tirole), European Economic Review, 22 (1983), 3-31

 

 “Capital as a Commitment:  Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility” (with J. Tirole), Journal   of Economic Theory, 31, (1983), 227-250.

 

“Learning by Doing and Market Performance” (with J. Tirole), Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1983), 522-530.

 

“The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look” (with J. Tirole), American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 361-366.

 

“Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology,” (with J. Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), 383-402.

 

“A Theory of Exit in Duopoly” (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 54 (2986), 943-960.

 

“A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation” (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (1986), 366-376.

 

“Understanding Rent Dissipation:  On the Uses of Game Theory in Industrial Organization” (with J. Tirole), American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 77 (1987), 176-183.

 

 “Game Theory for Industrial Organization:  Introduction and Overview” (with J. Tirole), Ch. 5 in D. Schmalansee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York, 1989.

 

 “Upgrades, Buybacks, and Trade-Ins,” (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (1998), 235-258.

 

 “The Neo-Luddite's Lament:  Excessive Upgrading of Computer Software (with G. Ellison), Rand Journal of Economics, 31 (2000), 253-272.

 

“Customer Poaching and Brand Switching” (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 31  (2000), 634-657.

 

“Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by the Sole Supplier of a Network Good” (with J. Tirole), Journal of Industrial Economics, 48 (2000), 373-390.

 

"Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?" (with G. Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2003), 1249-1278.

 

“Word-of-Mouth Learning” (with A. Banerjee), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 1-22.

 

“Competing Auctions,” (with G. Ellison and M. Mobius), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2004), 30-66.

 

“Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition,” (with M. Villas-Boas), in T. Hendershott, ed., Economics and Information Systems, Vol. 1, Elsevier, Oxford, 2007.

 

“Existence of Equilibrium in Double Auctions" (with M. Möbius and A. Szeidl),  Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007), 550-567.

“Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents,” (with R.M. Anderson and G. Ellison), Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2010), 2-23.

 

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Foundations and Mathematics of Game Theory  

 

“Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games” (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (1983), 251-268.

 

“Limit Games and Limit Equilibria” (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1986), 261-279.

 

“On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements” (with D. Kreps and D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 354-380.

 

“Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players” (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 1-18.

 

 “Game Theory for Industrial Organization:  Introduction and Overview” (with J. Tirole), Ch. 5 in D. Schmalansee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York, 1989.

 

 “Rational Play with Payoff Uncertainty” (with E. Dekel), Journal of Economic Theory, 52 (1990), 243-267.

 

 “Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium” (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 236-260.

 

 “Self-Confirming Equilibrium” (with D.K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 523-546.

 

 “When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?” (with D.K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer), Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 46-71.

 

“Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium” (with E. Dekel and D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 89 (1999), 165-185.

 

“Learning to Play Bayesian Games,” (with E. Dekel and D.K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 282-303.

 

“Topologies on Types,” (with E. Dekel and S. Morris), Theoretical Economics, 1(2006), 275-309.

 

“Interim Rationalizability,” (with E. Dekel and S. Morris), Theoretical  Economics, 2 (2007), 15-40.

 

“Existence of Equilibrium in Double Auctions" (with M. Möbius and A. Szeidl),  Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007), 550-567.

 

“Superstition and Rational Learning,” (with D. K. Levine), American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 630-651.

 

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Bargaining, Contracts, Mechanism Design

 

“Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information” (with J. Tirole), Review of Economics Studies, 50 (1983), 221-247.

 

“Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information” (with D.K. Levine and J. Tirole), pp. 73-98 in A. Roth, ed., Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

 

“Limit Games and Limit Equilibria” (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1986), 261-279.

 

“A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation” (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (1986), 366-376.

 

“Incomplete-Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities” (with D.K. Levine and J. Tirole), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (1987), 37-50.

 

“Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships” (with B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), 1-32.

 

“Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts” (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 58 (1990), 1279-1320.

 

 “A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents” (with J. Tirole), Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995), 75-93.

 

“Customer Poaching and Brand Switching” (with J. Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 31  (2000), 634-657.

 

“Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations and the Hold-Up Problem,” (with P. Aghion, R. Holden, T. Kunimoto and O. Tercieux), 2010.

 

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Repeated Games:   

 

“The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information” (with E. Maskin), Econometrica, 54 (1986), 533-554.

 

“Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games” (with E. Maskin), American Economic Review, 80 (1990), 274-279.

 

“Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games” (with E. Maskin), Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), 194-206.

 

“Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players” (with D. Kreps and E. Maskin), Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), 555-573.

 

 “On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games” (with E. Maskin), Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 428-438.

 

“An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information” (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 54 (1991), 26-47.

 

“Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships,” in J. J. Laffont, ed., Advances in Economic Theory:  Sixth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

 

“Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players” (with D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 62 (1994), 103-135.

 

“The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information” (with D.K. Levine and E. Maskin), Econometrica, 62 (1994), 997-1039.

 

“Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection,” (with L. Imhof and M. Nowak), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102 (2005), 10797-10800.

 

“The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 132 (2007), 461-473.

 

“Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?” (with L. Imhof and M. Nowak),   Journal of Theoretical Biology 247(2007) 27-49.

 

“Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient” (with D.K. Levine and S. Takahashi),  Games and Economic Behavior  61(2007), 27-49.

                       

“Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring” (with D.K. Levine), Review of Economic Design  10(2007), 173-192.

 

“Repeated Games with Frequent Signals,” (with D.K. Levine), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009), 149-195.

 

 “Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown,” (with Y. Yamamoto), Econometrica, 78 (2010), 1673-1710.

 “Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal,” (with W. Olszweski), 2009, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

“Slow to Anger and Fast to Forget:  Leniency and Forgiveness in an Uncertain World,” (with A. Dreber and D.G. Rand), 2010.

 “Who Cooperates in Repeated Games?”, (with A. Dreber and D.G. Rand), 2010.

“Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games,” (with Yuichi Yamamoto), forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory.

“The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,” (with Yuichi Yamamoto), forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory.

 

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Reputation Effects

 

“Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents” (with D. Kreps), Review of Economic Studies, 54 (1987), 541-568.

 

“Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed” (with D.K. Levine), Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992), 561-581.

 

“Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships,” in J. J. Laffont, ed., Advances in Economic Theory:  Sixth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

 

“Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent,” (with M. Celentani, D.K. Levine, and W. Pesendorfer), Econometrica, 64 (1996), 691-704.

 

When is Reputation Bad?” (with J. Ely and D.K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 63 (2008), 498-526.

 

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Macroeconomics

 

“Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium” (with P. Diamond), Journal of Political Economy, 97 (1989), 606-619.

 

“Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique” (with D.K. Levine), ), Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (2009), 2354-2371.

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Evolution and Learning:  

 

“Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks” (with C. Harris), Journal of Economic Theory, 57 (1992), 420-441.

 

“Self-Confirming Equilibrium” (with D.K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 523-546.

 

“Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium” (with D.K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 547-574.

 

“Rules of Thumb for Social Learning” (with G. Ellison), Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 612-643.

 

“Learning Mixed Equilibria” (with D. Kreps), Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (1993) 320-367.

 

 “Learning in Extensive Games, I:  Self-Confirming Equilibria,” (with D. Kreps), Games and Economic Behavior, 8 (1995), 20-55.

 

“Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learning” (with G. Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 93-126.

 

“Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play,” (with D.K. Levine), The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19 (1995), 1065-1089.

 

“Measuring Players’ Losses in Experimental Games” (with D.K. Levine), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 479-506.

 

“Learning in Games:  Where Do We Stand?” (with D.K. Levine), European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 631-639.

 

“Conditional Universal Consistency” (with D.K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 29 (1999), 104-130.

 

“An Easier Way to Calibrate” (with D.K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 29 (1999), 131-137.

 

“Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium” (with E. Dekel and D.K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 89 (1999), 165-185.

 

“Learning Purified Equilibria” (with G. Ellison), Journal of Economic Theory, 90 (2000), 84-115.

 

“Learning to Play Bayesian Games,” (with E. Dekel and D.K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 282-303.

 

“Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations,” (with M. Nowak, A. Sasaki, and C. Taylor), Nature, 428 (2004), 646-650.

 

“Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations,” (with M. Nowak, A. Sasaki, and C. Taylor), Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 66 (2005), 1621-1644.

 

“Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection,” (with L. Imhof and M. Nowak), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102 (2005), 10797-10800.

 

“Learning and Belief-Based Trade,” (with D. K. Levine), The Latin American Journal of Economics, 42 (2005), 199-207.

 

“Superstition and Rational Learning,” (with D. K. Levine), American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 630-651.

 

“Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutations,” (with L. Imhof, M. Nowak and C. Taylor), Theoretical Population Biology, 70 (2006), 352-363.

 

“Imitation Processes with Small Mutations,” (with L. Imhof), Journal of Economic Theory, 131 (2006), 251–262.

 

 “An Economist’s  Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning,” (with D.K Levine), Artificial Intelligence  171 (2007), 378-381.

 

“Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?” (with L. Imhof and M. Nowak),   Journal of Theoretical Biology 247(2007) 27-49.

 

“Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations” (with L. Imhof), Journal of Economic Theory, 140 (2008), 229-245.

 

“Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics,” (with G. Ellison and L. Imhof), Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (2009), 98-114.  

 

“Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play,” (with S. Takahashi), Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011), 100-120.

 


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Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics,  and Game Theory Experiments

 

“Rules of Thumb for Social Learning” (with G. Ellison), Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 612-643.

 

“Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learning” (with G. Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 93-126.

 

“Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics,Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (2006), 694-711.

 

“A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control,” (with D.K. Levine), American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 1449-1476.

 

“Winners Don’t Punish,” (with A. Dreber, D. Rand, and M. Nowak), Nature, 452 (2008), 348-351.

 

“Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation,” (with A. Dreber, T. Ellingsen, M. Nowak, and D. Rand), Science, 325 (2009), 1272-1275.

Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation,” (with P.A. Pathak), Journal of Public Economics, 94 (2010), 78-86.

“Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs,” (with D.K. Levine),  forthcoming in AEJ: Microeconomics.

“Timing and Self-Control,” (with D.K. Levine), 2010.

“Slow to Anger and Fast to Forget:  Leniency and Forgiveness in an Uncertain World,” (with A. Dreber and D.G. Rand), 2010.

 “Who Cooperates in Repeated Games?”, (with A. Dreber and D.G. Rand), 2010.

 

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10. 

            http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/files/Subgame-Perfect%20Implementation.pdf

11.  “Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs,” (with D.K. Levine), 2010.

            http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/files/Risk%20Delay.pdf

12.  “Slow to Anger and Fast to Forget:  Leniency and Forgiveness in an Uncertain World,” (with A. Dreber and D.G. Rand), 2010.

            http://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/files/Slow%20to%20Anger.pdf

13.  “Timing and Self-Control,” (with D.K. Levine), 2010.

            http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/files/Timing%20and%20Self-Control.pdf

14.  “Who Cooperates in Repeated Games?”, (with A. Dreber and D.G. Rand), 2010.